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Abstract
We study the political determination of the proportion of students attending university
when access to higher education is rationed by admission tests. Parents di¤er in income
and in the ability of their unique child. They vote over the minimum ability level required
to attend public universities, which are tuition-free and nanced by proportional income
taxation. University graduates become high skilled, while the other children attend vo-
cational school and become low skilled. Even though individual preferences are neither
single-peaked nor single-crossing, we obtain a unique majority voting equilibrium, which
can be either classical (with 50% of the population attending university) or ends-against-
the-middle, with less than 50% attending university (and parents of low and high ability
children favoring a smaller university system). The majority chosen university size is
smaller than the Pareto e¢ cient level in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium. Higher
income inequality decreases the majority chosen size of the university. A larger positive
correlation between parentsincome and childs ability leads to a larger university pop-
ulated by a larger fraction of rich students, in line with the so-called participation gap.
Our results are robust to the introduction of private schooling alternatives, nanced with
fees.
JEL codes: D72, I22
Keywords: majority voting, ends-against-the-middle, non single-peaked preferences,
non single-crossing preferences, higher education participation gap, income ability corre-
lation, size of university
1 Introduction
In many countries across the globe, the public sector o¤ers tuition-free higher education
nanced through general taxation. This is the case in a large number of European and
Latin American countries, as well as in two of the BRIC countries (Brazil and India).
According to Eurydice (2013) and OECD (2013), Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Malta, Norway, Poland, Scotland, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Sweden, and Germany charged higher education students no tuition fees or extremely low
administrative fees in the academic year 2012/2013. In other countries such as Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Italy, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Portugal, Spain and Turkey,
fees were below or very close to e1,000 per year.1 Moreover, in these countries, youths
from underprivileged backgrounds are usually eligible for generous grant programs. Rather
than by fees, access to university education is rationed by some measure of academic ability
i.e., access is limited to students who demonstrate some minimum ability level.2
In this paper, we study the political determination of higher education admission
standards i.e., of the minimum ability level required to access higher education. This
threshold ability level in turn determines the fraction of the population receiving a uni-
versity education and becoming highly skilled. We are therefore interested in the political
determination of the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers in the economy, when
access to higher education is rationed by admission tests.
Figure 1 reports both the enrolment rate (full-time and part-time students in public
and private institutions) among 20 to 29 year old students and the proportion of 25 to 64
years old who have obtained a tertiary degree, for the European countries listed above, in
1This was also true of the UK from the 1960s until 1997, and of China and Russia until the 1990s.
Within Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay currently
provide tuition-free university education to domestic students, while the Chilean government recently
announced that their country will join this group by 2016. Worldwide, close to two billion people currently
live in countries with tuition-free public universities. See OECD (2013) and Carnoy et al. (2013).
2The test verifying that a minimum ability is attained may take the form of a university admission
test (as in Spain or the UK), or may be merged with the exam taken at the end of secondary education
(as in Belgium and France, for instance).
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2010.3 A striking feature of this gure is that, notwithstanding the heterogeneity across
countries, both measures depicted are strictly lower than one half for all countries.
Insert Figure 1 around here
Our aim in this paper is to build a simple political economy model where the mini-
mum ability level of higher education students is determined through majority voting,4
to investigate the characteristics of the majority voting equilibrium, and to study how
it is a¤ected by factors such as the degree of income inequality, the correlation between
income of the parents and the academic ability of the children, the availability of private
schooling alternatives or the labor market wage premium for higher education graduates.
We assume that parents di¤er in income and in the academic ability of their unique
child. Children whose ability is below a threshold level attend a costless vocational pro-
gram and become low-skilled, while those whose ability is at least equal to the threshold
attend university and become high-skilled. University is nanced with an income tax on
the whole (parents) population. The future wage earned by students is the product of
their ability and of the reference wage of their skill level. The skill premium (di¤erence
in reference wage across skill levels) depends on the relative supply of each type of labor,
and is thus a function of the ability threshold democratically chosen.5 Parents care for
their childs future wage and vote over the minimum ability level giving access to higher
education.
We rst show that parents of low ability children most-prefer a minimum ability level
at university that leaves their child unskilled, while parents of high ability children most
prefer a minimum ability level compatible with their child attending university. The
3The source for Figure 1 is OECD (2012), Table A1.4. and Table C1.1a., respectively.
4Voting is the most natural way to endogenize the fraction of students attending public universities
in democracies.
5This assumption accords well with basic intuition and with state-of-the-art models of the labor market
(e.g. Acemoglu, 2003; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Carneiro and Lee, 2011).
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intuition runs as follows. For their child to attend university (and enjoy the larger high-
skilled wage), parents have to set the minimum ability threshold at most equal to their
childs ability level. This can prove very costly for parents of a low ability child (because
of the tax cost of a large university system), and for rich parents (who bear a larger
share of the burden of nancing public universities). Such parents then most prefer their
child to become low-skilled. Note that this does not entail that they oppose any positive
university size, because they want to restrict the supply of low skill agents to boost their
childs wage.
The voting problem we consider has an inherent theoretical interest, since individual
preferences are neither single-peaked in the minimum ability level at university nor single-
crossing (à la Gans and Smart 1996), because of the switch to vocational schooling when
that level becomes larger than the childs ability. We nevertheless prove the existence
of a unique majority voting equilibrium (a Condorcet winning value of the minimum
ability required to access university), which can be either classical(where parents with
children in the bottom half resp., top half of the ability distribution prefer a larger
resp., smaller university size) or ends-against-the-middle à la Epple and Romano
(1996) (where parents of both low and high ability children prefer a smaller university
size, in opposition to parents of middle ability kids).6 While the equilibrium size of the
public university is 50% of the student population in the classical equilibrium, it is
strictly less than 50% in the other equilibrium. The ends-against-the-middle equilibrium
is then in line with Figure 1, while the 50% participation rate in higher education in
the classical equilibrium corresponds to targets announced during electoral campaigns by
Tony Blair in 2001 for the UK, and by François Hollande in 2012 for France.
Focusing on the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, we obtain that the equilibrium
university size is too small, compared to its Pareto e¢ cient level. The decisive voters
child does not attend university, so that the voters preferred university size balances the
tax benet of a smaller university with the resulting lower vocational wage for his child.
6After completing this research, Bernardo Moreno has pointed out to our attention that individual
preferences in our setting satisfy the top monotonicity requirement: see Barberá and Moreno (2011).
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The decisive voter then does not take into account another social cost of decreasing the
university size, which is to decrease the wage of the marginal agents whose access to
university is barred.
Turning to the comparative statics analysis of majority voting equilibrium, we nd
four factors which unambiguously decrease the university size, both by making the ends-
against-the-middle equilibrium more likely and by decreasing the university size in that
equilibrium: a more costly university system, a smaller degree of altruism of parents, a
vocational wage less sensitive to the supply of low skilled workers, and a larger income in-
equality (modelled as a means-preserving spread of the income distribution). An increase
in the fraction of poor parents makes the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium more likely,
but has an ambiguous e¤ect on the equilibrium size of the university in that case.
Results obtained so far assume away any correlation between parents income and
childs ability. Lifting this assumption, we obtain that a larger positive correlation in-
creases both the majority chosen university size in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium
and the fraction of university students with rich parents. We obtain this result both an-
alytically with two income levels, and numerically in a more general environment with,
among others, a continuum of parental income levels. This result provides a potential
explanation to the puzzling experience of many countries since the end of World War II,
where a dramatic expansion of higher education has not closed the so-called participa-
tion gap, dened as the di¤erence in higher education participation rates between rich
and poor students.7 Observe that we take the correlation between income and ability as
a datum of our problem. We come back to this point in the concluding section.
Finally, we show throughout the paper that our results are robust to the introduction of
several natural extensions, such as a continuum of parental income levels, parents utility
concave in their own consumption, uncertainty as to the future income of the child, costly
7There is a growing empirical literature that provides evidence on this process for di¤erent countries.
See among others Blanden and Machin (2004) and Galindo-Rueda et al. (2004) for the UK, Bratti et al.
(2008) for Italy, Carnoy et al. (2012) for the BRIC countries, Rahona-López (2009) for Spain and Vona
(2012) for 12 European countries.
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vocational schools, non-proportional taxation, university peers e¤ects, an endogenous
high skilled reference wage, and private schooling alternatives (nanced exclusively by
attendance fees), both at the vocational and university levels.
Our paper belongs to a relatively small but growing literature studying access condi-
tions to higher education, together with its nancing. Most contributions focus on the
impact of fees and on various subsidization policies. Fernández and Rogerson (1995)
assume that citizens vote over the size of a tax-nanced subsidy and obtain that the
political equilibrium subsidy level is not large enough to allow poor students to access
higher education, resulting in redistribution from the poor to the rich. Building upon this
observation, Garcia-Peñalosa and Wälde (2000) compare the e¢ ciency and equity e¤ects
of a traditional tax-subsidy scheme, a graduate tax and loans, and obtain that the latter
two fare better than the former. Moreover, when education outcomes are uncertain, the
graduate tax is to be preferred. Haupt (2012) extends the political economy analysis of
the traditional tax-subsidy scheme to a dynamic setting and shows that high and low
levels of public spending in higher education may alternate in a democracy. Del Rey and
Racionero (2012, 2014) focus their attention on the political economy and the e¢ ciency
and equity properties of income-contingent loans. Borck and Wimbersky (2014) study nu-
merically majority voting over a traditional subsidy scheme, a pure loan scheme, income
contingent loans and graduate taxes by risk averse households who are heterogeneous in
income. Surprisingly, they nd that the poor favor the subsidy scheme, even though they
pay part of its tax cost.8
Two papers study admission tests either together with, or instead of, (subsidized)
tuition fees: Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2008) study the socially optimal examination-
cum-fees policy. They assume that students observe only a private, noisy signal of their
ability, and that universities can condition admission decisions on the results of noisy tests.
Tests are part of the optimal policy provided that their results are not public knowledge.
8Other important contributions in the area (e.g. Epple et al. 2006; De Fraja and Valbonesi, 2012;
Romano and Tampieri, 2013; or Fu, 2014) are less closely related to this paper.
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The paper most closely related to ours is De Fraja (2001). As in our model, parents
di¤er in income and in the ability of their child and face a binary educational choice
but, unlike here, universities charge fees to students, and the future income of children is
random and determined only by their own education decision. An important consequence
of these assumptions is that better-o¤ children are more likely to attend university than
poorer ones in a laissez-faire equilibrium. This is not the result of credit constraints
(assumed away) but of the risk involved in an investment in higher education: preferences
satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion and so better-o¤ parents are more willing to
bear the risk. The market allocation then fails to provide equality of opportunity and
to reach production e¢ ciency. De Fraja (2001) then studies two forms of intervention,
exclusive of each other: an admission test similar to ours, and a subsidy nanced by
proportional income taxation. In both cases, he analyzes the majority voting equilibrium
and shows that both policies enhance equality of opportunity, but that their equity and
e¢ ciency e¤ects are ambiguous. Preferences for the admission test are simpler than in
our model because parents whose children do not attend university are indi¤erent as to
its size (since they do not nance university education through taxes, and the future
income of an unskilled agent is not a¤ected by the proportion of university graduates),
allowing for the direct application of the median voter theorem. Our paper can then be
seen as an extension of De Fraja (2001) in three dimensions: (i) the decision to attend
university by an additional agent exerts an externality on the rest, by raising low-skilled
wages and lowering the skill premium, (ii) we study majority voting over the admission
test level in the presence of (full) subsidy of fees, and (iii) we allow for the existence of
private alternatives to public education. We nd these extensions important because labor
market e¤ects are a crucial aspect of the problem, because many countries do not use fees
to ration access to university, as we argued above, and because interactions between public
and private educational options have proved essential in similar contexts (e.g. Epple and
Romano, 1996).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: after presenting the model in
section 2, we describe households preferences over the admission ability threshold in
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section 3. Existence of a majority voting equilibrium is studied in section 4. The outcome
of the voting process is then compared to the e¢ cient admission threshold in section 5.
Section 6 provides a comparative statics analysis of the majority chosen university size,
while section 7 shows that our results are robust to the introduction of private schooling
alternatives. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
We model a static economy, with a continuum of individuals (parents) of mass one. Par-
ents di¤er in their (exogenous) income w which can take two values: wL and wH with
wL < wH . A fraction  has low income, so that average income is w = wL + (1 )wH :9
Each parent has one child of a given (and known) ability degree : Abilities are distributed
over ]0; ] according to the CDF F (:) and density f(:). While the smallest conceivable
ability may tend toward zero, the smallest ability level actually observed in the economy
is , and the density has full support over [; ]. The median value of  is denoted by
med. With a slight abuse of language, we denote by (; i) with i 2 fL;Hg the type of the
parent. Except in the second part of section 6, we assume no correlation between parents
income and childs ability, so that the distribution of ability is the same whether i = L or
H.
The (binary) skill level j of children is determined by education. Children who go to
a vocational school (j = V ) become low-skilled, while those who go to university (j = u)
become high-skilled. We denote by u the minimum level of ability required to be admitted
to a university and to become high-skilled. After completing school, children work and
obtain a wage which is the product of their idiosyncratic ability, , and of the reference
9Our framework generalizes to a continuum of income levels on the interval [wL; wH ]. More precisely,
we obtain exactly the same type of equilibrium with a continuum of income levels as with two income
levels, and all results reported in sections 3 and 4 would hold with a continuum of income levels. Having
just two income levels simplies the notation and allows to obtain unambiguous analytical comparative
statics analysis when modifying the income distribution (see Proposition 4). We provide at the end of
section 6 numerical results with a continuum of income levels.
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wage for their skill level, !j.10 The skill premium !u !V is increasing (resp., decreasing)
in the fraction of low-skilled (resp., high-skilled) agents, and is always strictly positive.
To simplify the algebra (and without loss of generality for our results), we assume that
the skilled reference wage !u is exogenous (for instance, set by the world market). At the
same time, !V decreases with the proportion of low-skill agents. As we will see shortly, all
children bright enough to be accepted at the university (i.e., with  > u) indeed attend
university and become high-skilled, so that the proportion of low-skill agents is F (u).
To save on notation, we will often use the shortcut !V (u) rather than !V (F (u))). Note
then that !0V (u) = (@!V (F (u))=@F ) f(u) < 0. Observe that, although the individual
wage !V (u) of low-skilled agents is decreasing in u,11 their average wage,
1
F (u)
uZ

!V (u)dF ();
may be increasing in u by a composition e¤ect, since their average ability increases with
the threshold u.
The cost of vocational education is normalized to zero, while universities are costly:
the (constant) cost per student of university education is cu, and is nanced through
a proportional tax on income at rate t, paid by all parents.12 The government budget
constraint is then
t w = cu(1  F (u)):
10So, even though there are only two skill levels, the actual income of workers of a given skill level
is continuously increasing in their ability. All results in this paper can be generalized to a setting with
uncertainty (as to the probability of actually graduating or the future wage amount) as long as the
expected wage of students increases with  (for instance because of a lower dropout rate) and is larger
when attending university rather than the vocational school, whatever .
11One could argue that the sensitivity of wages to the own productivity parameter should be weaker
for unskilled workers than for skilled ones. Our results are robust to this possibility, with unskilled wages
given by !V (u), provided that 0 <   1. See footnote 17 for the impact of  = 0.
12Since all children get some form of education in our model, adding a cost for vocational education
would not change our results provided we interpret cu as the di¤erence between the per student university
and vocational school costs. Also, the assumption of proportional taxation is made for simplicity only,
with all our results continuing to hold provided that taxes paid increase with income.
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Parents care both about their own consumption (after-tax income) and about the
future wage of their kid. If their child becomes highly skilled, the parents utility is
Uu(u; wi; ) = wi(1  t(u)) + !u; (1)
while it is
UV (u; wi; ) = wi(1  t(u)) + !V (u); (2)
if the child remains low-skilled.13 The parameter  > 0 measures the intensity of the
altruism of parents towards their child.
The timing of the model is as follows. Parents rst vote over the threshold u. They
then decide individually whether to enrol their unique child at university. Solving the
second stage is straightforward: since the skill premium is always positive, i.e. !u >
!V (u) 8u, we have that Uu(u; wi; ) > UV (u; wi; ) for all : parents pay the same tax
in both cases (since the university has the same size), but their child has a larger income
when high skilled than when low skilled. All parents with   u thus enrol their child at
university.
We next look at parentspreferences over the threshold level u before aggregating
these preferences through majority voting.
3 Individual preferences over u
We proceed in two steps. We rst look at individualspreferences over u as a function
of the (exogenous) type of education received by the child (university or vocational), and
we then look at overall preferences over u when the education type is determined by
whether the childs ability reaches the threshold u or not.
13The assumption that utility is linear in consumption is made for simplicity only. Our results generalize
to any setting with concave utility for own consumption, provided that the degree of relative risk aversion
is everywhere either lower than one or greater than one. In the latter case, the roles played by low and
high income are interchanged in the analysis - the proof is available upon request to the authors. We
provide numerical results where utility is concave in current consumption at the end of section 6.
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We start with the preferences over u of parents whose children attend a university:
@Uu(u; wi; )
@u
=  wit0(u) > 0
since
t0(u) =  cuf(u)
w
< 0: (3)
Conditional on their child going to university, parents always most-prefer a smaller uni-
versity size (i.e., larger u) since it decreases their tax bill without a¤ecting the exogenous
reference wage received by high-skilled agents.14
Alternatively, the most-preferred value of u of a parent whose child remains low-
skilled, which we denote by u(wi; ), satises the following FOC:

@!V (F (

u))
@F
=  cuwi
w
: (4)
This individually optimal size trades o¤the smaller vocational wage associated to a smaller
university (the left-hand side of (4)) with the smaller tax bill (the right-hand side of (4)).
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the SOC

@2!V (F (u))
@F 2
f(u) < 0
to be satised is that @2!V (F (u))=@F 2 < 0. We assume from now on that the SOC holds
and that  < u(wi; ) <  for all (; i).
The following lemma performs the comparative statics analysis of u:
Lemma 1 u(wi; ) decreases with  and  and 

u(wL; ) < 

u(wH ; ).
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem on the FOC (4), and assuming an interior
solution, we obtain that15
@u(wi; )
@wi
s
=  t0(u) > 0; (5)
@u(wi; )
@
s
= 
@!V (F (u))
@F
< 0;
@u(wi; )
@
s
= 
@!V (F (u))
@F
< 0:
14Adding university peer e¤ects would reinforce the attractiveness of a smaller (and more elitist) uni-
versity. So would making !u endogenous and decreasing in the fraction of high skill workers.
15Observe that we keep w constant in (5) since our objective is to compare u(wL; ) and 

u(wH ; ):
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Richer parents pay more taxes and are thus in favor of a smaller university when their
child does not attend university. Also, parents of brighter low-skilled kids put more weight
on the reference vocational wage (because their children wages increase with ) and thus
favor a larger university to restrict the supply of low-skilled agents and to boost this
reference wage. A similar phenomenon occurs for all parents when the degree of altruism
is increased.
The following lemma will prove useful in several proofs.
Lemma 2 There exists a unique value of  for each income level i 2 fL;Hg, denoted by
^i, such that 

u(wi; ) >  for all  < ^i and 

u(wi; ) <  for all  > ^i:
Proof. Observe that lim
!0
u(wi; ) =  > 0, 

u(wi;
) <  and @u(wi; )=@ < 0.
We now study the preferences over u when the childs educational track is endogenous.
This means that a parent anticipates that his child will be low-skilled if u >  and will
attend university and become high-skilled if and only if u  : His utility over u is then
given by
U(u; wi; ) = Uu(u; wi; ) if u  ;
= UV (u; wi; ) if u > :
Observe that there is a discontinuous decrease in utility for all agents at u = , since the
skill premium is positive and so Uu(u; wi; ) > UV (u; wi; ) 8; u. It is straightforward
to see that preferences are single-peaked in u if 

u(wi; ) <  (i.e., if   ^i) (see Figure
2) but are not if u(wi; ) >  (i.e., if  < ^i) (see Figure 3).
Insert Figures 2 and 3 around here
The following proposition studies which parents most-prefer a university size compat-
ible with their child becoming high-skilled.
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Proposition 1 For each parents income level wi, there exists a unique value of , denoted
by ~i, such that all agents with  < ~i most-prefer putting their kids in a vocational school
with u = 

u(wi; ) >
~i, while all  > ~i most-prefer enrolling their kid at the smallest
university that accepts him: u = . Moreover, we have that ~i < ^i.
Proof. See Appendix A
The parent of a higher ability child benets relatively more from going to university,
for two reasons: (i) the child benets more from the skill premium !u   !V and (ii) it
is socially (and individually) less costly for the university to enrol his child (because the
implied size of the university, and thus its tax cost, is lower). This explains why there
exists a unique threshold value of  below (resp., above) which parents most-prefer a
university size consistent with their child becoming low-skilled (resp., high-skilled).
The next lemma performs the comparative statics analysis of this threshold individual
~i.
Lemma 3 ~ is decreasing in  with ~L < ~H .
Proof. ~i is such that Uu(wi; ) UV (wi; ) = 0. Applying the implicit function theorem,
we obtain that
@~i
@wi
=   t(

u(wi;
~i))  t(~i)
 wit0(~i) + 
h
!u   !V (u(wi; ~i))
i
> 0; since ~i < ^i (Proposition 1) and by Lemma 2,
@~i
@
=  
~i
h
!u   !V (u(wi; ~i))
i
 wit0(~i) + 
h
!u   !V (u(wi; ~i))
i < 0:
Recall that individual ~i is indi¤erent between the smallest university accepting his
child (u = ~i) and a smaller (at 

u(wi;
~i) > ~i) university system that would exclude his
child. A richer individual pays a larger fraction of the cost of the university system, and
thus has to be the parent of a more gifted child to be indi¤erent between the two options.
Alternatively, a more altruistic parent puts more weight on the skill premium enjoyed by
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university graduates and thus has to be the father of a less gifted child to be indi¤erent
between the two options.
We nowmove to the determination of the majority voting equilibrium threshold ability.
4 Majority voting equilibrium
We rst introduce this straightforward denition.
Denition 1 Let MVu be the median most-preferred value of u in the population.
The following lemma compares MVu with med:
Lemma 4 (a) MVu is unique. (b) If 

u(wH ; ) < med then 
MV
u = med, (c) otherwise
MVu > med:
Proof. (a) Follows from the facts that u(wi; ) and  are continuous and strictly
monotone in  for i 2 fL;Hg and that f() has full support. (b) If u(wH ; ) < med
then ~L < ~H < med (since @

u(wi; )=@ < 0 and @~i=@wi > 0) so that all  > med
most-prefer u =  > med, while all  < med most-prefer either u =  < med or
 < u(wi; ) < med (since @

u(wi; )=@ < 0). Hence 
MV
u = med: (c) If 

u(wH ; ) > med
then it is clear that more than one half of the polity (made of rich parents with low ability
children, and of parents of higher-than-med ability children ) most-prefer a higher-than
med value of u. It is then straightforward that 
MV
u > med:
Lemma 4 is straightforward when one looks at Figures 4 (Lemma 4(b)) and 5 (Lemma
4(c)).
Insert Figures 4 and 5 around here
Proposition 2 proves the existence of a majority voting equilibrium and shows that it
can be of two types. It makes use of the following assumption.
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Assumption 1 max
h
u(wH ; ~H); 

u(wL;
~L)
i
 MVu :
Assumption 1 is essentially technical and guarantees the existence of a Condorcet
winner when voting over u.16
Proposition 2 (a) If u(wH ; ) < med, then 
MV
u = med is the unique Condorcet win-
ning value of u. (b) If 

u(wH ; ) > med and if Assumption 1 is satised, then 
MV
u > med
is the unique Condorcet winning value of u.
Proof. See Appendix C
The type of majority voting equilibrium, as well as the equilibrium size of the university
system, depend crucially on the preferences of a rich parent with the lowest ability child.
If such a parent (who most-prefers not to enrol his child at university) prefers a relatively
large university system, then the decisive voters are the (poor and rich) parents of a
child with median skill and we obtain a classical equilibriumwhere half of students
are enrolled in the university and where the top half of the ability distribution favors a
smaller university while the bottom half favors a larger one (see Figure 4). Among those
who favor a larger university, parents of low ability children do this in order to boost
the vocational wage of their child while parents of children with larger abilities would like
their child to become highly skilled. Observe that a university system enrolling one half of
the student population is precisely the target of current French policy (and of UK policy
under Prime Minister Blair).
If the rich parent of the lowest ability child prefers a relatively small university system
(and if Assumption 1 is satised), the majority voting equilibrium is of the ends-against-
the-middletype (see Figure 5), with four decisive voters, and where parents with either
low or high (strictly larger than median) ability children prefer a smaller university size
(to decrease their tax bill in both cases), while parents of children with medium abilities
16We refer the reader to Appendix B for a description of the equilibrium existence issues faced when
Assumption 1 is not satised.
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prefer a larger university system (to enable access to university for the higher ability
children in this group, and to further boost the vocational wage for the lower ability
group). The equilibrium proportion of children attending university is strictly less than
one half, which corresponds to the stylized fact reported in the Introduction.17
We now compare the majority chosen value of u with its Pareto e¢ cient level, before
performing its comparative statics analysis.
5 Comparison with the Pareto e¢ cient allocation
With our quasi linear framework, the Pareto e¢ cient allocation corresponds to the one
chosen by a utilitarian social planner maximizing the sum of individual utilities.18 Assum-
ing to simplify, in this section, that there is a single parental income level w, the optimal
value of u would maximize

uZ

!V (u)dF () +


Z
u
!udF ()  cu(1  F (u));
with the following FOC, where Wu denotes the Pareto optimum,
19
cu = 
264Wu (!u   !V (Wu ))  @!V (F (Wu ))@F
WuZ

dF ()
375 : (6)
The LHS of (6) denotes the marginal social benet of increasing u, while the RHS
represents its marginal cost. The latter can be decomposed into two e¤ects: the rst
17If  = 0 (see footnote 11) so that unskilled wages do not increase with , then the optimal university
size of parents whose children do not go to university is no longer strictly monotone (as the proof of
lemma 4 requires) but constant. In that case, the majority voting equilibrium is always a classical one,
with 50% attending university.
18We assume that the social planner takes only parents utilities into account. This allows for a
meaningful comparison with the equilibrium under majority voting. Adding the utility of the children
would overweigh them in the social welfare function, since parents already care for them. See footnote
20 for the impact of such a move on the Pareto e¢ cient level of u.
19Observe that the SOC holds since @2!V (F (u))=@F 2 < 0:
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term represents the loss of the skill premium by the marginal agent u who loses access
to university, while the second term measures the decrease in vocational wage of all low-
skilled agents when the university size is decreased.
We now compare this Pareto e¢ cient level Wu with the one chosen under majority
voting. We concentrate on the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium. Denoting by dec the
decisive voter who most-prefers MVu > dec (i.e., whose child becomes low-skilled, see
Figure 5), the FOC for MVu is
cu =  dec@!V (F (
MV
u ))
@F
= 0: (7)
The decisive voter dec does not consider the rst marginal cost of increasing u, namely
the loss of the skill premium by the marginal student MVu . Moreover, the decisive voter
considers only the impact of u on the vocational wage of his child, rather than on all
low-skilled agents. We then obtain the following su¢ cient condition for the two e¤ects to
reinforce each other.20
Proposition 3 In an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium with a single parental income
level, a su¢ cient condition for the majority chosen university size to be too small compared
to its Pareto e¢ cient level, MVu > 
W
u , is that
dec <
WuZ

dF ():
6 Comparative statics analysis of the majority cho-
sen ability threshold level
With the classical equilibrium, we have MVu = med, so that the result that 50% of
students go to university is not a¤ected by changes in parameters of the model. We
20Putting more weight on childrens utilities in the social welfare function is equivalent to increasing
 in (6) but not in (7) and would result in a lower value of Wu , adding to these two e¤ects in the same
direction. Proposition 3 would then hold a fortiori.
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then investigate the circumstances under which an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium
emerges, as well as how the majority voting size of the university sector is a¤ected in that
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 (a) The following six factors render an ends-against-the-middle equilib-
rium more likely :
(i) a more expensive university, cu,
(ii) a smaller degree of altruism of parents, ,
(iii) a vocational wage less sensitive to supply (i.e., a smaller absolute value of @!V (F )=@F ),
(iv) a larger income inequality (in the form of a means-preserving spread of income lev-
els),
(v) a poorer society (i.e., a larger proportion  of low income agents, driving the average
income down) and
(vi) a lower minimum ability level of children (keeping med constant).
(b) The rst three factors listed above also decrease the size of the university (i.e., increase
the value of MVu ) in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium. Factor (iv) also increases
MVu provided that income inequality is large enough to start with. Factors (v) and (vi)
have an ambiguous impact on MVu .
Proof. See Appendix D.
An ends-against-the-middle equilibrium occurs when the rich parent of the child with
the lowest ability level most-prefers a public university enrolling less than one half of
the students. All factors increasing u(wH ; ) without a¤ecting med then make such an
equilibrium more likely. Three factors make the university system more expensive for
this individual: a larger income level (since tax nancing of universities is proportional to
income), a smaller average income (i.e., tax base) and a larger cost per student cu. Three
factors decrease the benet of a large university for this individual: a less altruistic society,
a lower minimum level of ability and a smaller sensitivity of the vocational wage to the
number of low-skilled workers (the latter two factors decrease the incentive to restrict the
supply of low skills in order to increase the childs vocational wage).
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A more costly university, a lower level of altruism and a lower responsiveness of the
reference vocation wage to the fraction of low skilled laborers increase u for all voters,
and thus increase MVu as well. The impact of these three variables on the type and size
of equilibrium is then consistent, since they make the university system smaller in both
cases.
A higher income inequality decreases the most-preferred university size of rich parents
of low ability children (because their tax bill increases) but increases that of the poor
parents (for the symmetrical reason). If income inequality is large enough so that all poor
parents most-prefer a larger university size than the one chosen under majority voting
in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, the latter e¤ect has no impact on the median
most-preferred size, while the former e¤ect decreases this median most-preferred size.
Finally, increasing the proportion of poor people has two e¤ects of opposite signs on
MVu : a negative direct impact (since poor people prefer a lower value of 

u than rich
people of the same ability) and a positive indirect impact (by decreasing the average
income, inducing all voters to prefer a higher value of u), so that the overall impact
remains ambiguous. Likewise, since the identity of the decisive voters in an ends-against-
the-middle equilibrium depends on the whole distribution of , decreasing  while keeping
med constant has an ambiguous impact on 
MV
u .
Observe that introducing some correlation between w and  (while keeping the mar-
ginal distributions of skills and of income unchanged) does not a¤ect the nature of the
voting equilibrium (classical or ends-against-the-middle), because the introduction of cor-
relation does not impact the governments budget constraint (since all children whose
ability is above the chosen threshold go to university, whatever the income level of their
parent). We now study the impact of the correlation between income and ability on the
size of the university in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium.
We introduce a positive correlation between w and  using the concept of median-
preserving spreadintroduced by Allison and Foster (2004). Assume that we have
F () = FL() + (1  )FH();
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where Fi() denotes the distribution function of  among parents with income wi, and
fi() the corresponding density function. We assume that these density functions satisfy
fL()  fH() for all  < med;
fL()  fH() for all  > med:
The case with no correlation between income and ability corresponds to fL = fH for all
. We increase the correlation between w and  by having fL()   fH() increase for
all  < med and decrease for all  > med, while keeping F () unchanged. In words,
for any value of  < med, the fraction of children having a wL parent increases, while
the opposite occurs for children with  > med. Note that med is not a¤ected, since the
marginal distribution F () is not a¤ected by assumption.
We then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium with med  ~H , increasing
the correlation between w and  in the way just dened increases the majority-chosen
university size (i.e., lowers MVu ):
Proof. The correlation between income and ability a¤ects neither the type of equilibrium
nor individual preferences over u, so that ~H is not a¤ected either. All agents with  > ~H
prefer u = , whatever their income level, so that the increase in correlation does not
a¤ect their preferences. Among agents with  < ~H , low income parents most-prefer a
lower value of u than high income agents of the same  (with 

u(wL; ) < 

u(wH ; ) for
 < ~L and  < 

u(wH ; ) for ~L <  < ~H), and the fraction of low income parents among
these agents increases provided that med  ~H , hence the result.
The preferences of parents with higher-than-~H ability children are not a¤ected by
their income, since they most-prefer the smallest university that enrols their children.
The preferences over u of parents with  < ~H are a¤ected by their income level, with
low-income parents preferring a larger university system (i.e., a lower u) than rich parents
(whether they prefer their child to become highly skilled or not) because of their lower
tax cost. Increasing the correlation between income and ability, by increasing the share
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of poor parents among those with lower-than-median abilities, then results in a larger
majority chosen size of the university system.
Observe that Proposition 5 is driven not by the increase in the fraction of rich parents
with smart kids, but rather by the increase, among children with lower abilities, of the
fraction of those with poor parents. Also, since children with  > MVu > med end up
attending university, an increase in the correlation between income and ability (in the way
dened above) results in a larger fraction of high-skilled children coming from rich families
(even though more people get access to universities). A positive correlation between in-
come and ability then increases both the proportion of student attending universities, and
the participation gap (dened as the larger proportion of students from rich background
among university students than among vocational students).
Observe also that an opposite result would obtain if, rather than introducing a positive
correlation between income and ability, we assumed that the proportion of citizens who
turn out and vote were increasing with income (a well-known empirical regularity). In
that case, turnout would not a¤ect voting results among the agents with  > ~H (since
they have the same preferences for u irrespective of their income), but would decrease
the fraction of poor voters below ~H , which would result in a smaller equilibrium univer-
sity. By the same reasoning, a gradual extension of the voting franchise, modeled as an
increase in the fraction of poor agents allowed to vote, would result in a larger equilibrium
university size
In order to shed more light on the impact of the correlation of income and skills on
the equilibrium size of university, we now resort to numerical simulations. We also use
these simulations as an opportunity to show that the results obtained in sections 3 and
4 generalize to a setting with a continuous distribution of income, and where parents
utilities are concave in their own consumption.
We then assume in the remainder of this section that the utility of parents is given by
Uu(u; wi; ) = u (wi(1  t(u))) + !u;
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and by
UV (u; wi; ) = u (wi(1  t(u))) + !V (u);
where the utility function u(:) belongs to the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
family,
u(c) =
c1    1
1   ;
and where the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  is set to 0.71, which is the middle
value found by Chetty (2006).
We assume that w and  are distributed according to the cdf H(w; ) and the pdf
h(w; ) over the interval [wL; wH ]X[; ]. The marginal distribution of w is denoted by
G(:) for the cdf and g(:) for the pdf. As in the rest of the paper, the marginal distribution
of skills is denoted by F (:) for the cdf and f(:) for the pdf. We model the correlation
between income and skills by using the concept of copula. From Sklars theorem (Sklar
(1959)), there exists a joint distribution C on [0; 1]2, called a copula, such that its two
marginals are uniform on [0; 1] and
H(w; ) = C(G (w) ; F ()):
As an illustration, we assume that both F and G are uniformly distributed, and that the
distribution H is obtained using the Archimedean copula
H(w; ) =  1((G (w)) + (F ()));
where  is called the generator function. We provide an example with the so-called
Gumbel copula, where the generator function is given by
(x) = (ln(x))  :
Increasing  results in an increase in the correlation between w and : the correlation is
equal to zero (independence) when  = 1, and increases to one as  becomes large enough.
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Figure 6 shows the most-preferred value of u as a function of skill and income.21 The
thick (resp., dashed) curves represent the most-preferred value of u for the highest (resp.,
lowest) income level wH (resp., wL). The black curves represent low-skilled agents who
prefer u >  while the blue curves represent agents who most-prefer u = . Agents with
income in-between wL and wH have most-preferred values of u which are in-between those
preferred by wL and wH : we have depicted the rst part of the 

u curve of agents with
the average income Ew = w. The horizontal axes crosses the vertical axes at (, med).
The correlation between income and risk does not a¤ect individual preferences over u,
but of course a¤ects its majority chosen value. We then have an ends-against-the-middle
equilibrium, whatever the correlation between income and risk. Without any correlation,
we obtain the value of MVu depicted by the dot dashed horizontal line in Figure 6. At
the equilibrium, 47.8% of students go to university.
Insert Figure 6 around here
Figure 7 depicts the two coalitions which face each other at this equilibrium, in the
(income, skill) space. Agents located below the thick curve tend to be rich parents of
low-skilled children, who do not attend university. They are joined by agents above the
dashed line, whatever their income level, whose children do attend university. Members
of both groups favor a smaller university size. Put together, these two groups represent
exactly one half of the population. They face the group located in-between the dashed
line and the thick curve, whose members favor a larger university.
Insert Figure 7 around here
We then vary the correlation between income and skill (by increasing the value of 
above one, and we report on Figure 8 how this a¤ects the value of MVu ). We see that
21We assume that !u = 100; !V (F ) = 90   80F 4; wL = 10; wH = 100;  = 0:2;  = 2;  = 0:2; and
cu = 50:
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a larger positive correlation increases the university size (i.e., lowers the value of MVu ).
Our numerical simulations then conrm the results obtained with two income levels in
Proposition 5. With our numerical simulations, we obtain at the limit (when corr(w; ) =
1) a classical equilibrium where exactly 50% of the students attend university.22
Insert Figure 8 around here
Finally, we show in Figure 9 how increasing the correlation between parents income
and childs skill a¤ects the composition of the universitiesstudent body. Without any
correlation, exactly 47.8% of children of parents of all income levels attend university.
As soon as corr(w; ) is increased, the fraction of children attending university increases
with the parents income (the participation gap). At the same time, the overall fraction of
students attending university in the population also increases with corr(w; ). We obtain
numerically that this second impact is of second order importance compared to the rst.
Observe from Figure 9 that the horizontal axis is set at 50%, and that the intersection
between the curves (representing the fraction of children of parents with income w at-
tending university) and this axis moves to the left as the correlation is increased. For
instance, when corr(w; )=0.14, parents in the top 28% of the income distribution (i.e.,
with w > 75) have more than 50% chance that their child attend university. This propor-
tion increases monotonically with income and with the correlation between income and
skill. At the limit, when income and skill are perfectly positively correlated, university is
composed exclusively of all children of parents in the top half of the income distribution.
Insert Figure 9 around here
We now show that our analysis is robust to the introduction of private schooling
alternatives.
22With our copula, increasing the correlation means increasing the density around the line joining
(wL; ) and (wmax,) on Figure 7, resulting in fewer parents in the zone below the thick curve. At the
limit, when corr(w; ) = 1, all parents are located on this line, and we obtain a classical equilibrium.
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7 Extension to the case with private alternatives
In this section, we go back to the original formulation of the model presented in section
2 (linear utilities, two income levels, no correlation between income and ability), but
we introduce the possibility for parents to choose either tuition-free public education or
fee-charging private institutions, both at the vocational and the academic levels. Four
alternatives are thus available: to become low-skilled, either by attending a public (V ) or
private () vocational school, or to become high-skilled in a public (u) or a private (e)
university.23 Access to any university remains rationed by ability, with u the minimum
level of ability required to be admitted to a (public or private) university and to become
high-skilled.
To enrol their child in a private institution, parents must pay tuition fees equal to c for
private vocational schools, and to ce for private universities. Students who receive private
education are more generously rewarded in the labor market than their publicly educated
counterparts. On the one hand, the reference wage of a low-skilled agent attending a
public vocational school, !V , remains a decreasing function of the proportion of low skilled
workers, irrespective of whether they graduate from a private or public school, while the
reference wage of high-skilled agents graduating from a public university remains given by
the exogenous !u. On the other hand, privately educated workers receive a mark-up over
these reference wages. The reference wage for high-skilled agents is !u+e if they graduate
from a private university, with e > 0 exogenously given. The corresponding wage for an
agent of ability  is then  (!u + e) ; so that the wage premium for attending the private
(as opposed to public) university is e. Likewise, the reference wage for low-skilled
agents is equal to !V (u)+ when graduating from a private vocational institution; the
corresponding wage for an agent of ability  is  (!V (u) + ) and the wage premium
for attending the private (as opposed to public) vocational school is  > 0.
23Private vocational education may also be interpreted as lower quality university education. In that
case, three types of higher education institutions would coexist: low quality private universities, elite
private universities and public universities of intermediate quality.
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As previously, parents care both about their own consumption (after-tax income) and
about the future wage of their child. The utility of a parent of income wi whose child
has ability   u is represented by Uu(u; wi; ) as described in (1) if his child attends a
public university, and by
Ue(u; wi; ) = wi(1  t(u)) +  (!u + e)  ce; (8)
if his child attends a private university. Likewise, the utility of a parent of income wi
whose child has ability  < u is represented by UV (u; wi; ) as described in (2) if his
child attends a public vocational school, and by
U(u; wi; ) = wi(1  t(u)) +  (!V (u) + )  c; (9)
if the child receives private vocational education.
The timing of the model is unchanged. In the last stage, parents choose where to enrol
their child. We assume that the skill premium is always positive, i.e. !u > !V () + .
This ensures that parents do enrol their child at university as soon as   u, as previously.
In that case, and comparing (1) with (8), we obtain that they prefer private to public
universities if  > eu where
eu =
ce
e
; (10)
i.e., if the gain for the parent of a higher market wage for his child, e, is larger than
the tuition fees ce. Note that eu depends only on exogenous parameters and that it is
independent of household income. From now on, we will then use the term of elite
private universities, since they cater to the children with the highest abilities.
If  < u, then parents prefer the private vocational school to the public one if  > V
where
V =
c

: (11)
In order to allow for the four alternatives to coexist at equilibrium, we assume that
 < V < eu < , which requires the cost per unit of wage premium to be larger for the
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elite universities than for private vocational schools:
ce
e
>
c

:
The above two thresholds, along with the minimum ability required to attend univer-
sity, fully characterize second stage choices. If V < u < eu, then children with abilities
 < V go to public vocational schools, those with V   < u go to private vocational
schools, those with u    eu go to public universities and those with  > eu attend
private universities. In that case, all four types of schools are active at equilibrium. If
u < V , then no one attends private vocational schools, since all  < u attend public
ones. If u > eu, then no one attends public universities, since all those with  > u go
to private ones.
The government budget constraint then becomes
t =
cu
w
(F (eu)  F (u)) if eu > u;
= 0 if eu  u:
We now show that parentspreferences over u are basically unchanged when we intro-
duce private alternatives. The preferences of parents whose children attend a university
are such that
@Uu(u; wi; )
@u
=
@Ue(u; wi; )
@u
=  t0(u)wi;
where
t0(u) =  cu
w
f(u) if eu > u;
= 0 if eu  u:
The key observation is that, although private alternatives make public universities cheaper
for the tax payers, they do not a¤ect the marginal tax benet when the threshold u is
increased, except if u is large enough that no one attends public universities, in which
case the marginal tax benet is nil.
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The most-preferred value of u of a parent whose child is low skilled is given by
@UV (u; wi; )
@u
=
@U(u; wi; )
@u
= 
@!V (F (

u))
@F
f(u)  t0(u)wi: (12)
This condition is equivalent to (4) when eu > u. When eu  u, we obtain that (12) is
always negative, since further increases in u decrease the reference wage !V but do not
decrease the individuals tax payment, which is nil. We then have that u(wi; )  eu, and
in order to concentrate on interior solutions, we assume from now on that this inequality
is strict for all agents.24
We then obtain that our previous results (lemmas and propositions relating to the
existence, type, size and comparative statics of the equilibrium) carry through to the case
with private alternatives.25 The intuition for this robustness of our results is that the
most-preferred values of u, namely 

u(wi; ) (when  < ~i) and u =  (when   ~i)26
are not a¤ected by the introduction of private alternatives, which simply shift upward
(by    c if  > V and e   ce if  > eu) the utility a parent of type  obtains
as a function of u. More precisely, the type of equilibrium (classical vs ends-against-the-
middle) is not a¤ected, because it depends on the comparison of u(wH ; ) and med, none
of them being a¤ected by the availability of private alternatives. The ability threshold
for attending (public or private) universities in an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium,
MVu , is not a¤ected either, even though ~i may be a¤ected.
27 This is due to the fact that
variations in ~i only a¤ect individuals with  < 

u(wi;
~i) < 
MV
u under Assumption 1.
24This is the equivalent of our assumption that u(wi; ) <  in section 3.
25Proofs available upon request.
26Parents of type  > eu are actually indi¤erent between any u 2 [eu; ]. This does not a¤ect our
results provided that med < eu i.e., that less than 50% of children attend private universities, a most
reasonable assumption.
27If ~H < V , then the availability of private alternatives does not impact ~i since agents of that type
do not make use of any private institution. If V < ~i < eu, then the availability of private alternatives
increases ~i because the private alternative is used by agents of that type if they attend a vocational
school () but not if they go to university (u). Finally, we can exclude the case where ~i > eu, because
u(wH ; ) < eu (by assumption) and because @

u(wi; )=@ < 0 (by Lemma 1).
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Whether these individuals prefer their child to become low-skilled (with u = 

u(wi; ))
or high-skilled (with u = ) then does not a¤ect the median most-preferred value of u,
MVu .
The following proposition studies how the Pareto e¢ cient level of u is a¤ected by the
availability of private alternatives, and how it compares with the majority-chosen level in
an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium with a single parental income level.
Proposition 6 In an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium with a single parental income
level,
(a) If Wu without private alternatives is lower than V , then the availability of private
alternatives does not impact the value of Wu .
(b) If Wu without private alternatives is larger than V (but lower than eu), then the
availability of private alternatives increases the value of Wu .
(c) In both cases, Proposition 3 remains unchanged.
Proof. See Appendix E28
In part (a), the introduction of private alternatives decreases the absolute cost (for
society and for the decisive voter) of the public university system, but does not a¤ect
the marginal trade-o¤s of increasing u, because no student goes to a private vocational
school. In part (b), increasing u moves the marginal student from a public university
to a private vocational school. This is less detrimental to welfare than moving the same
student to a public vocational school, because the net benet for a parent of enrolling his
child in a private (as opposed to public) vocational school, u c, is positive. We then
obtain that Wu increases, compared to the case with no private alternative. Finally, part
(c) shows that, even though Wu is (weakly) larger with private alternatives than without,
while MVu is unchanged, the condition mentioned in Proposition 3 remains su¢ cient to
28As explained above, we concentrate on the case where u(w; ) < eu for all , so that 
MV
u < eu
in any ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, and it makes little sense to cover the -empirically irrelevant-
case where Wu > eu:
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have MVu > 
W
u . The intuition for this result is that the decisive voter under-estimates
the marginal cost of increasing u in the same way as before, but now also over-estimates
its marginal benet (since the marginal social benet is cu c, while the marginal private
benet for the decisive voter, through a decrease in his tax bill, is cu).
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have built a simple model to assess the political support for higher
education in a setting where university admission is conditioned on a minimum ability
level. The model developed is very parsimonious but, as detailed in numerous footnotes
throughout the analysis, the results we obtain are robust to the introduction of several
natural extensions, such as a continuum of parental income levels, parents utility con-
cave in their own consumption, uncertainty as to the future income of the child, costly
vocational schools, non proportional taxation, university peers e¤ects, and an endogenous
high skilled reference wage.
We nish by mentioning two (among many) dimensions in which the model can be
generalized. First, although we have shown that our results are robust to the introduction
of private, fee supported schooling alternatives, we have assumed that no parent is credit
constrained. Relaxing this assumption would move the model closer to reality, and would
open up a role for subsidies. Second, one of the most interesting results obtained above
shows that a larger correlation between parents income and childs ability results in a
larger university system. Our model takes this correlation as given. We would like to
endogenize it, for instance by adding a preliminary stage to the model where parents can
spend resources to improve their childs results on the test determining their access to
university. Credit constraints would also play a crucial role in this case.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We denote by
Uu(wi; ) = Uu(; wi; )
the highest utility level a parent of type (; i) can attain by sending his child to university
(i.e., when setting u = ), and by
UV (wi; ) = UV (

u(wi; ); wi; )
the highest utility level attained when his child attends vocational school (i.e., when
setting u = 

u(wi; )). We have
Uu(wi; )  UV (wi; ) = wi [t(u(wi; ))  t()] +  [!u   !V (u(wi; ))] : (13)
Using the envelope theorem, we obtain
@ (Uu(wi; )  UV (wi; ))
@
=  wit0() +  [!u   !V (u(wi; ))] > 0:
It is easy to see that lim
!0
Uu(wi; ) < lim
!0
UV (wi; ) since lim
!0
u(wi; ) =  so that
t() < lim
!0
t(), while Uu(wi; ) < U

V (wi;
) since u(wi; ) > 0 and !V (

u(wi;
)) < !u:
Hence the existence and unicity of ~i. Moreover, Uu(wi; ^i) > U

V (wi; ^i), implying that
~i < ^i.
Appendix B: Assumption 1
To convey the intuition for why Assumption 1 is necessary to guarantee the existence
of a majority voting equilibrium when u(wH ; ) > med, assume that there is only one
income level, w. Figure 10a shows a situation under which Assumption 1 is not satised.
In that case, the individual ~ is indi¤erent between u = ~ < 
MV
u and 

u(w;
~) > MVu >
~.
Figure 10b reports the utility function U(u; w; ~) of individual ~. It is clear that, unlike
in the proof of Proposition 2 (b), MVu is not preferred to all  < 
MV
u by individual ~,
since this individual attains a higher utility level with u = ~   " with " > 0 low enough.
This opens up the possibility of a Condorcet cycle and of the inexistence of a Condorcet
winning value of u.
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Insert Figures 10a and 10b here
Observe that Assumption 1 is not satised when
F (u(w; ~))  F (~) > 1=2;
which implies that med 2]~; u(w; ~)[ i.e., that a large fraction of the population is
concentrated around the median ability level.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
(a) Assume that u(wH ; ) < med, so that we claim that 
MV
u = med (see Lemma 4 (a))
is preferred by a majority of parents to any other value of u. It is easy to see that all agents
with   med prefer med to any value of u < med (since Uu(u; wi; ) > UV (u; wi; )
when u < , and since Uu(u; wi; ) increases with u). Since they form a majority,
med cannot be beaten by any u < med. We now look at agents with  < med. They
all have u(wi; ) < med, since 

u(wH ; ) < med together with @

u(wi; )=@wi > 0 and
@u(wi; )=@ < 0. They then all prefer med to any u > med, and since they form a
majority med cannot be beaten by any u > med and constitute the unique Condorcet
winner.
(b) Assume that u(wH ; ) > med, so that we claim that 
MV
u > med (see Lemma 4 (b))
is preferred by a majority of parents to any other value of u. Since @

u(wi; )=@ < 0,
its inverse is unique over its range [u(wi; ~i); 

u(wi; )]. We then denote by 

i (u) the
unique type  of a parent of income wi would most-prefer u 2 [u(wi; ~i); u(wi; )] (and
send his child to vocational school) and we dene i (u) =  for u > 

u(wi; ). It is clear
that i (u) decreases with u on [

u(wi;
~i); 

u(wi; )]. We then dene by
V (u) = 1  F (u) + F (L(u)) + (1  )F (H(u)) (14)
the proportion of parents who most-prefer a larger value of the tracking university thresh-
old than u. Note that this set of parents is constituted both of parents of low  kids who
would not be enrolled at university with this u, and of parents of large  kids who would
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go to university with this u. Observe that V (med) > 1=2 and that @V (u)=@u < 0.
Assumption 1 guarantees that V (MVu ) = 1=2, so that 

i (
MV
u ) is well dened with
  i (MVu ) for i 2 fL;Hg. Moreover, we have that med < MVu < u(wH ; ):
We now prove that MVu is a Condorcet winner. As in part (a) above, 
MV
u is preferred to
any value of u > 
MV
u by the individuals who most-prefer a value of u lower than 
MV
u .
In this case, this group is made of agents with i (
MV
u )    MVu and, by denition of
MVu , constitutes one half of the electorate. As in part (a) above, agents with  > 
MV
u
prefer MVu to any smaller value of u. We then have to prove that the remaining group,
made of parents of low  children who favor a larger than MVu value of u also prefer
MVu to any lower value of u. This group is formed of all parents with  < 

i (
MV
u ).
For this group, we then have that  < MVu  u(wi; ). Since @Uu(u; wi; )=@u > 0
and @UV (u; wi; )=@u > 0 for u < 

u(wi; ), together with Uu(u; wi; ) > UV (u; wi; )
for u < , a necessary and su¢ cient condition for 
MV
u to be preferred to any lower
value of u is thus that Uu(wi; ) < UV (
MV
u ; wi; ) for all  < 

i (
MV
u ). It is easy to see
(from the proof of Lemma 1) that @
 
Uu(wi; )  UV (MVu ; wi; )

=@ > 0 so that, since
Uu(wi; 

i (
MV
u )) < UV (
MV
u ; wi; 

i (
MV
u )), all agents with  < 

i (
MV
u ) strictly prefer 
MV
u
to any lower value of u. By denition of 
MV
u , we then have that (at least) one half of the
population share this preference, so that MVu cannot be defeated at the majority voting
and is the unique Condorcet winner.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4
The value of u(wi; ) is determined by the following FOC (where we have made use
of (3) and (4))

@!V (F (u))
@F
+
wi
w
cu = 0: (15)
(a) An ends-against-the-middle equilibrium arises when u(wH ; ) > med. We then look
at all factors that increase u(wH ; ), (with med constant). Repeated application of the
implicit function theorem on (15) with wi = wH and  =  then gives results (i) to (vi).
(b) (i)-(iii) A larger cu, a smaller  and a smaller absolute value of @!V (F )=@F all in-
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crease u(wi; ) for all wi and all , and thus increase 
MV
u in an ends-against-the-middle
equilibrium. Observe that we need not check their impact on ~i since, under Assumption
1, variations in ~i only a¤ect individuals with 

u(wi;
~i) < 
MV
u .
(b) (iv) If inequality is large enough that u(wL; ) < 
MV
u < 

u(wH ; )) to start with,
then a mean-preserving spread of the income distribution, which increases u(wH ; ) but
decreases u(wL; ), unambiguously increases 
MV
u since it increases the fraction of rich
parents who favor u(wH ; ) > 
MV
u , while keeping unchanged the fraction of poor agents
who prefer u(wL; ) < 
MV
u (since all poor parents are such that 

u(wL; ) < 
MV
u to start
with).
(b) (v) Increasing  decreases w, which in turn increases u(wi; ) for all agents. But since
there is a larger fraction of poor people, who prefer a lower value of u than rich people
of the same ability, the impact on MVu is ambiguous.
(b) (vi) In an end-against-the-middle equilibrium, the decisive voter is not the individual
with the median value of , med, so that keeping med constant but decreasing  has an
ambiguous impact on MVu .
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 6
(a) The social objective when u < V is

264 uZ

!V (u)dF () +
euZ
u
!udF () +
Z
eu
 (!u + u) dF ()
375
 cu(F (eu)  F (u))  ce (1  F (eu)) ;
whose FOC with respect to Wu is identical to (6).
(b) The social objective, assuming that V < u < eu, is

264VZ

!V (u)dF () +
uZ
V
 (!V (u) + ) dF () +
euZ
u
!udF () +
Z
eu
 (!u + u) dF ()
375
 cu(F (eu)  F (u))  c (F (u)  F (V ))  ce (1  F (eu)) ;
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The FOC with respect to Wu can be written as
cu + (
W
u    c) = 
264Wu  !u   !V (Wu )  @!V (F (Wu ))@F
WuZ

dF ()
375 ; (16)
with the SOC holding since @2!V (F (u))=@F 2 < 0. Comparing (6) and (16), we see that
the RHS is identical, while the LHS is larger with (16) when Wu > V :
(c) We have already established that MVu is not a¤ected by the availability of private
alternatives. The value of Wu is not a¤ected either if it is lower than V . If V < 
W
u <
eu, we can reformulate (16) as
cu   c = 
264Wu  !u    !V (Wu ) +   @!V (F (Wu ))@F
WuZ

dF ()
375 :
Comparing with (6), we see that the decisive voter now over-estimates the marginal benet
of increasing u from a social perspective (which he considers to be cu, rather than cu c),
which actually reinforces the two e¤ects mentioned above in Proposition 3. Hence the
condition mentioned in Proposition 3 remains su¢ cient (but even less necessary than in
section 5) to obtain that MVu > 
W
u .
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Figure 1 : Higher education in European countries in 2010
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Figure 3 : Non Single-Peaked Preferences
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Figure 5 : Ends-against-the-middle equilibrium
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Figure 6 : Most  preferred university size with no correlation between income and skill
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Figure 7 : Coalitions in the end  agaisnt  the  middle equilibrium with no correlation
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Figure 8 : The equilibrium size of the university as a function of the correlation between income and skill
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Figure 9 : The impact of the correlation between income and skill on the composition of the universities' s student body
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Figure 10 b : Non single-peaked preferences
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Figure 10 a : Assumption 1 not satisfied
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